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Abstract. High voltage power transformers are one of the most critical
equipments in the electric power grid. A sudden failure of a power trans-
former can significantly disrupt bulk power delivery. Before a transformer
reaches its critical failure state, there are indicators which, if monitored
periodically, can alert an operator that the transformer is heading to-
wards a failure. One of the indicators is the signal to noise ratio (SNR)
of the voltage and current signals in substations located in the vicin-
ity of the transformer. During normal operations, the width of the SNR
band is small. However, when the transformer heads towards a failure,
the widths of the bands increase, reaching their maximum just before the
failure actually occurs. This change in width of the SNR can be observed
by sensors, such as phasor measurement units (PMUs) located nearby.
Identifying Code is a mathematical tool that enables one to uniquely
identify one or more objects of interest, by generating a unique signature
corresponding to those objects, which can then be detected by a sensor.
In this paper, we first describe how Identifying Code can be utilized for
detecting failure of power transformers. Then, we apply this technique
to determine the fewest number of sensors needed to uniquely identify
failing transformers in different test systems.
Keywords: Transformer Health, Identifying Codes, PMU Placement
1 Introduction
The electric power grid is arguably the most critical of all the infrastructures
as other infrastructures, such as, communication, transportation and finance are
heavily dependent on it. Similarly, high voltage (HV) power transformers, gen-
erators, and transmission lines are the most critical components of the electric
power grid. Therefore, an untimely loss of HV transformers can be catastrophic
for not only the electrical infrastructure, but also the other critical infrastruc-
tures that depend on it. Accordingly, it will be helpful if it can be recognized
before the event, that a transformer is heading towards a failure, so that correc-
tive measures can be undertaken. Fortunately, before a transformer reaches its
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critical failure state, there are “cues”(or indicators) which, if monitored period-
ically, can alert an operator that the transformer is heading towards a failure.
One of the indicators is the signal to noise ratio (SNR) of the voltage and current
signals in substations located in the vicinity of the transformer. During normal
operations, the width of the SNR bands are small. However, when the trans-
former heads towards a failure, the widths of the bands increase, reaching their
maximum just before the failure actually occurs. This change in width of the
SNR can be observed by phasor measurement units (PMUs) located nearby.
Identifying Code is a mathematical tool that enables one to uniquely identify
one or more objects of interest, by generating a unique signature corresponding
to those objects, which can then be detected by a sensor. In this paper, the
objects of interest are HV transformers. When a transformer is heading towards
failure, it generates “indicators”, which, if monitored by some “sensors”, may
provide information to an operator in the control center about the impending
failure of the transformer. Since the number of transformers in the grid is large,
and the sensors are expensive, one would like to deploy as few sensors as possible
(fewer than the number of transformers) and yet retain the capability that, when
a transformer is heading towards a failure, it can be uniquely identified.
PMU is a device that can be utilized as a “sensor” for monitoring the health
of transformers. When placed on a generator, load, or zero injection bus, in
the power grid, PMUs give the voltage of that particular bus, as well as the
currents flowing in the branches (lines or transformers) incident on that bus
(while being subjected to the PMU's measurement channel limitations). Since a
power transformer can only be placed between two buses, a judicious placement
of a few PMUs (sensors) can effectively monitor health of all the transformers,
and in case a transformer heads towards a failure, the sensors can create a unique
fault signature that enables the operator to identify the troubled transformer.
In this paper, we, (i) describe the Rudd power transformer failure incident
that motivated this study, (ii) describe how Identifying Code can be utilized for
unique identification of the transformers that are heading towards a failure, and,
(iii) provide a technique to compute the fewest number of sensors to be deployed,
to ensure unique identification of the transformers that are heading towards a
failure in standard test systems.
2 Related Work
Prior research on health monitoring using PMUs have been mostly directed
towards improving security and stability of the power system [1]. In addition, a
number of studies have focused on placement of PMUs [2,3] to realize a variety
of objectives. The problem under study in this paper can also be viewed as a
PMU placement problem as it computes the fewest number of PMUs and their
locations, so that the unique identification capability is realized. It is important
to highlight here that none of the PMU placement strategies proposed so far had
the unique identification capability as the objective for PMU deployment.
Karpovsky et. al. introduced the concept of Identifying Codes in [4] and pro-
vided results for Identifying Codes for graphs with specific topologies, such as
binary cubes and trees. Using Identifying Codes, Laifenfeld et. al. studied cover-
ing problems in [5]. A special case, where only a subset of nodes needs a unique
code, can be modeled with a bipartite graph, and was studied as “Discriminating
Codes” in [6]. This special case is relevant for our study as we focus on finding
unique signatures for a subset of nodes, instead of all the nodes, as is done in
Identifying Codes.
3 Lessons Learnt from Rudd Power Transformer Failure
During the early hours of June 1, 2016, a large power transformer at the Rudd
substation of Salt River Project (SRP), a large utility company in Arizona,
suddenly caught fire. A 27,000-gallon tank of mineral oil used as a transformer
coolant, burned, and spewed thick smoke over a large area. A few snapshots are
illustrated in Figs. 1(a) and 1(b) [7]. The cause of the failure was identified to be
bushing failure. Due to the redundancy present in the system design as well as
the fact that the fire broke out during low-load conditions (system load is small
in early morning), no power outages occurred. This incident highlights the need
for better monitoring techniques for these critical and expensive equipments.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Transformer fire at Salt River Project (SRP)’s Rudd substation in Avondale [7].
SRP shared their operational data leading up to the failure of this trans-
former with us for analysis. Because causes of such failures gradually build-up
over time, if one is paying attention, the signs of an impending failure may be
observable “days” before the actual failure event. PMUs continuously produce
outputs at a very fast rate (typically 30 samples per second). When placed near
transformers, PMUs, through their measurements, can serve as sensors to mon-
itor the health of the transformer, and capture degradation in the health of a
transformer over time. It may be noted that a PMU provides complex voltage
and current measurements at the bus where it is placed. If the PMU has to serve
as a sensor for monitoring transformer health, it must have a way to measure
it with a “cue” (or indicator or metric). This metric should be independent of
the “unit” of the measured quantity (either voltage or current), so that a proper
comparison can be made. Signal to noise ratio (SNR), a classical measure of the
quality of a signal, can serve as this desired metric. It compares the level of a
signal to the level of background noise that is present in it. Mathematically, the
SNR of a signal can be expressed as reciprocal of the coefficient of variation, i.e.,
the ratio of its mean to its standard deviation, as shown in Eq. 1.
SNR (in dB) = 10 ∗ log µ
σ
(1)
In Eq. 1, µ is the signal mean or expected value and σ is the standard devi-
ation, or an estimate thereof. It is difficult to directly compare different signals
(such as voltages and currents). However, SNR (in decibels) is a relative metric
and therefore, it can be used to compare diverse signals and create alerts/alarms.
The Rudd transformer failure data obtained from SRP, comprises of PMU read-
ings (voltages and currents) one year away from the day of the failure (June 1,
2016) up to the data collected only a few hours prior to the actual failure event.
Two important pieces of observation were made from the SRP data.
Observation 1: A steady growth in the width of the SNR bands (computed from
the voltage magnitude measurements obtained from neighboring substations),
was observed over a period of time, till the transformer failed. The observations
for three instances of time, as it approached the actual time of failure, are shown
in Fig. 2. Since the growth was similar in all three phases, it was concluded
that the SNRs were capturing an event that was affecting all three phases, and
not due to a single phase failure event, contributed by a current or a potential
transformer failure. Moreover, as the width was uniform over the observed time
period (an hour worth of data), it is clear that the captured event was not a
random transient event.
Observation 2: In observation 1, we noted that the width of the SNR band
at a specific PMU (sensor) location, increases as time approaches the actual
failure event. From the data it was also clear that, as the distance of the PMU
(sensor/monitoring device), from the transformer (monitored device) increased,
the width of the observed SNR decreased. Fig. 3 shows the decrease in the width
of the SNR bands as a function of the electrical distance (termed as hops) from
the Rudd transformer. The data was collected from eight substations (S1, ...,
S8) that neighbor Rudd, and had PMUs placed on them. It may be noted that
the Rudd substation itself did not have a PMU on it during the time of failure.
Given that the deteriorating condition of a transformer can be noticed by
PMUs located within a certain distance of the transformer, signals indicating the
deteriorating condition, can be utilized to deploy effective monitoring strategies,
so that an alarm is generated before a transformer reaches a critical failure state.
Identifying Code is a mathematical tool that can be used for monitoring trans-
formers in the power grid. Using this technique, the fewest number of sensors
needed to enable an operator to uniquely identify the failing transformer before
it reaches a critical failure state can be computed.
4 Overview of Identifying and Discriminating Codes
The notion of Identifying Codes [4] has been established as a useful concept
for optimizing sensor deployment in multiple domains. In this paper, we use
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 2. Variation in width of SNR as one moves closer (in time) to instant of failure.
Identifying Code of the simplest form and define it as follows. A vertex set V ′ of
a graph G = (V,E) is defined as the Identifying Code Set (ICS) for the vertex
(a)
Fig. 3. Standard deviation of width of SNR as one moves (spatially) away from the
failing equipment.
set V , if for all v ∈ V , N+(v) ∩ V ′ is unique where, N+(v) = v ∪ N(v) and
N(v) represents the set of nodes adjacent to v in G = (V,E). The Minimum
Identifying Code Set (MICS) problem is to find the Identifying Code Set of
smallest cardinality. The vertices of the set V ′ may be viewed as alphabets of the
code, and the string made up with the alphabets of N+(v) may be viewed as
the unique “code” for the node v. For instance, consider the graph G = (V,E)
shown in Fig. 4. In this graph V ′ = {v1, v2, v3, v4} is an ICS as it can be seen
from Table 1 that N+(v)∩ V ′ is unique for all vi ∈ V . From the table, it can be
seen that the code for node v1 is v1, the code for v5 is v1, v2, the code for v10 is
v3, v4, etc.
Fig. 4. Graph with Identifying Code Set {v1, v2, v3, v4}
Table 1. N+(v) ∩ V ′ results for all v ∈ V for the graph in Fig. 4
N+(v1) ∩ V ′ = {v1} N+(v2) ∩ V ′ = {v2}
N+(v3) ∩ V ′ = {v3} N+(v4) ∩ V ′ = {v4}
N+(v5) ∩ V ′ = {v1, v2} N+(v6) ∩ V ′ = {v1, v3}
N+(v7) ∩ V ′ = {v1, v4} N+(v8) ∩ V ′ = {v2, v3}
N+(v9) ∩ V ′ = {v2, v4} N+(v10) ∩ V ′ = {v3, v4}
Graph Coloring with Seepage (GCS) Problem: The MICS computation prob-
lem can be viewed as a novel variation of the classical Graph Coloring problem.
We will refer to this version as the Graph Coloring with Seepage (GCS) problem.
In the classical graph coloring problem, when a color is assigned (or injected)
to a node, only that node is colored. The goal of the classical graph coloring
problem is to use as few distinct colors as possible such that (i) every node re-
ceives a color, and (ii) no two adjacent nodes of the graph have the same color.
In the GCS problem, when a color is assigned (or injected) to a node, not only
does that node receive the color, but also the color seeps into all the adjoining
nodes. For example, if a node vi is adjacent to two other nodes vj and vk in the
graph, then if the color red is injected to vj , not only vj will become red, but
also vi will become red as it is adjacent to vj . Now if the color blue is injected
to vk, not only vk will become blue, but also the color blue will seep in to vi
as it is adjacent to vk. Since vi was already colored red (due to seepage from
vj), after color seepage from vk, it’s color will be a combination of red and blue
(purple). At this point, all three nodes vj , vk, and vi will have “distinct” colors
red, blue, and purple, respectively. The color assigned to a node may be due to:
(i) only injection at that node, (ii) only seepage from other adjoining nodes and
(iii) a combination of injection and seepage. The colors injected at the nodes
are referred to as atomic colors. The colors formed by the combination of two or
more atomic colors are referred to as composite colors. The colors injected at the
nodes (atomic colors) are all unique. The goal of the GCS problem is to inject
colors to as few nodes as possible, such that (i) every node receives a color, and
(ii) no two nodes of the graph have the same color.
Suppose that the node set V ′ is an ICS of a graph G = (V,E) and |V ′| = p.
In this case if p distinct colors are injected to V ′ (one distinct atomic color to one
node of V ′ ), then by the definition of ICS for all v ∈ V , if N+(v)∩V ′ is unique,
all nodes of G = (V,E) will have a unique color (either atomic or composite).
Thus computation of MICS is equivalent to solving the GCS problem.
Identifying Code is useful when the goal is to monitor all nodes of the graph
(i.e., each node is required to have a unique signature). However, in this paper
our focus is on monitoring the health of only power transformers. Moreover, in
Identifying Code a color can be injected at any node of the graph (i.e., a sensor
can be placed at any node of the graph). However, in the health monitoring
problem, a sensor placed far away from the equipment to be monitored, may not
be useful as “cues” (signals) indicating failing state of the equipment, may not
even reach this sensor because of its distance from the equipment. Accordingly,
some modification to the original concept of Identification is needed. The fol-
lowing modifications are sufficient to capture the new scenario: (i) We identify a
subset V ′ ⊆ V that needs to receive a unique color; (ii) For each node v ∈ V ′, we
compute Nk(v), where Nk(v) represents the k-hop neighbors of v (i.e., the set of
nodes in the graph whose shortest path distance to v is at most k); (iii). We con-
struct a Bipartite graph G′ = (V1∪V2, E) such that (a) V1 = V ′, (b) V2 = ∪v∈V1
Nk(v), and (iii) for nodes vi ∈ V1 and vj ∈ V2, there is an edge e ∈ E, if and
only if vj ∈ Nk(vi). With this modification, the transformer health monitoring
problem with the fewest number of sensors is equivalent to computation of the
smallest subset V ′2 ∈ V2 such that injection of colors to this set of nodes ensures
that each node in V1 receives a unique color through seepage. In this study, we
restrict our attention to k = 1 or k = 2 only, as cues of deteriorating health of
transformer may not be observable at distances k ≥ 3 (See Fig. 3).
A variation of Identification Code when restricted to Bipartite graphs is
known as Discriminating Code [6], and is defined as follows: Let G = (V1∪V2, E)
be an undirected bipartite graph and let N(v), denote the neighborhood of v,
for any v ∈ V2, a subset V ′2 ⊆ V2 is called the Discriminating Code of G if
∀v ∈ V1, N(v) ∩ V ′2 is unique. We will refer to critical equipment health moni-
toring problem, with the fewest number of sensors, as the Monitoring Critical
Equipment (MCE) problem, which may be stated formally in the following way:
MCE Problem: Find the smallest subset V ′2 ⊆ V2, such that injection of colors
at these nodes, ensures that each node v ∈ V1, receives a unique color through
seepage.
5 Problem Formulation
In this section, we formalize the problem of computing the fewest number of
sensors to be deployed to monitor all critical equipments (HV transformers) in
the power grid, so that, if they show signs of potential failure, then an operator
in the control room, can uniquely identify them. Once the failing equipment is
identified, corrective measures can be undertaken, such as a planned shutdown.
From our discussion in Section 4, it is clear that Identifying Code relates to an
underlying graph. In order to use Identifying Code to find the fewest number of
sensors to be deployed to monitor critical equipments, we first have to construct
a graph from the single line diagram (SLD) of the power system. Consider the
IEEE 14 Bus System shown in Fig. 5. We construct a graph G = (V,E) from the
SLD, where each node represents either a bus or a transformer, and two nodes
are connected by an edge if the corresponding buses, or bus and transformer are
connected. The Fig. 6 shows the graph G = (V,E) constructed from the IEEE 14
Bus SLD, shown in Fig. 5. In Fig. 6, the buses are represented by black circular
nodes and the transformers by red square nodes. In power systems, the monitor-
ing devices (such as the PMUs) can be placed on the ends of the transmission
lines, next to the buses [2]. In Fig. 6, the potential locations where a monitoring
device can be deployed are shown by small green squares.
The goal of this exercise is to determine the health of the red squares (trans-
formers) before they reach a critical state. Signal of failing health of a red square
reaches only up to a certain distance from the location of the red square, where
distance is measured in terms of number of hops. The monitoring devices can
only be placed at the green squares. If we assume that the signal of failing health
of a red square can reach k hops, then all green squares within k hop distance
of the red square will recognize that that particular red square (transformer) is
failing. This can be captured in a bipartite graph G = (V1 ∪ V2, E), where each
node v ∈ V1 represents a red square and each node v ∈ V2 represents a green
square. There is an edge e ∈ E connecting nodes vi ∈ V1 and vj ∈ V2 if the
signal from the red square ri, represented by node vi in Fig. 6, can reach the
green square gj , represented by node vj in Fig. 6. Such graphs corresponding to
the IEEE 14 Bus System, with k = 1 and k = 2, are shown in Fig. 7 and Fig.
8, respectively. Since the IEEE 14 Bus System has 5 transformers (red squares
Fig. 5. IEEE 14 Bus Test System
in Fig. 6), the vertex set V1 in the bipartite graphs shown in Figs. 7 and 8 has
5 nodes. Since, in the IEEE 14 Bus System, there are 40 potential locations for
placement of sensors (green squares), in Fig. 6, the vertex set V2, in the bipartite
graphs shown in Figs. 7 and 8, has 40 nodes (numbered from 6-45), denoted by
green circles. It may be noted that when k = 1, only 21 out of 40 potential loca-
tions are viable locations for placement of sensors as the other 19 locations are
not within 1-hop neighborhood of the transformers. However, when k = 2, all
40 nodes are viable locations for placement of sensors, as all of them are within
the 2-hop neighborhood of the transformers. It may be noted that some of the
nodes in Figs. 7 and 8, are labeled with strings such as “A”, “AC”, etc. The
explanation and significance of these strings are given in Section. 7.
6 Problem Solution
In this section, we provide an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) formulation
for solving the MCE problem, as stated below.
Instance: G = (V1 ∪ V2, E), an undirected bipartite graph.
Problem: Find the smallest subset V ′2 ⊆ V2, such that injection of colors at these
nodes, ensures that each node vi ∈ V1, receives a unique color (either atomic or
composite) through seepage.
We use the notation N(vi) to denote the neighborhood of vi, for any vi ∈ V1∪V2.
Corresponding to each vi ∈ V2, we use an indicator variable xi,
xi =
{
1, if a color is injected at node vi,
0, otherwise
Fig. 6. Potential Sensor Placement Locations in IEEE 14 Bus System
Fig. 7. Bipartite Graph corresponding to IEEE 14 bus system with for k = 1
Fig. 8. Bipartite Graph corresponding to IEEE 14 bus system with for k = 2
Objective Function: Minimize
∑
vi∈V2 xi
Coloring Constraint:
∑
vi∈N(vj) xi ≥ 1, ∀vj ∈ V1
Unique Coloring Constraint:
∑
vi∈{N(vj)
⊕
N(vk)} xi ≥ 1, ∀vj 6= vk,∈ V1
N(vj)
⊕
N(vk) denotes the Exclusive-OR (symmetric set difference) of the node
sets N(vj) and N(vk). It may be noted that the objective function ensures that
the fewest number of nodes in V2 are assigned a color. The Coloring Constraint
ensures that every node in V1 receives at least one color through seepage from the
colors injected at nodes in V2. A consequence of the Coloring Constraint is that,
a node in V1 may receive more than one color through seepage from the colors
injected at nodes in V2. The Unique Coloring Constraint ensures that, for every
pair of nodes (vj , vk) in V1, at least one node in the node set N(vj)
⊕
N(vk) ⊆ V2
is injected with a color. This guarantees that vj and vk will not receive identical
colors through the color seepage from the nodes in V2.
7 Experimental Results and Discussion
In this section, we present the results of of our technique on standard power
system test cases, such as IEEE 14, 30, 57, 118, PEGASE 89 bus, and Polish
2383 bus systems. As discussed in Section. 5, the IEEE 14 bus system has 5
transformers and 40 potential locations for placement of sensors. The bipartite
graphs for the IEEE 14 bus system for k = 1 and k = 2 are shown in Figs.
7 and 8. Our results obtained from the solution to the ILP show that the 5
transformers can be monitored with 4 sensors when k = 1, and 3 sensors when
k = 2. As shown in Fig. 7, for k = 1, if 4 sensors are deployed at nodes 14, 19,
27, and 30 (equivalently 4 colors A, B, C, and D are injected at these nodes,
shown in Fig. 7 by A*, B*, C*, and D*), the 5 transformers T1 through T5 will
receive unique colors AC, A, B, CD, and D, respectively. Similarly, for k = 2, if 3
sensors are deployed at nodes 8, 27, and 35 (equivalently 3 colors A, B, and C are
injected at these nodes, shown in Fig. 8 by A*, B*, and C*), the 5 transformers
T1 through T5 will receive unique colors AB, ABC, A, B, and BC respectively.
The significance of each transformer receiving a unique color (or a unique
signature), is the following. In the example shown in Fig. 8, if colors A, B and C
are injected at nodes 8, 27 and 35 (i.e., PMUs A, B, and C are placed at these
locations, among the 40 (6-45) potential locations), the transformers T1-T5 will
receive colors AB, ABC, A, B, and BC, respectively. Suppose that the control
room has three indicator lamps, 1, 2, and 3, corresponding to PMUs A, B, and
C, respectively. As long as the width of the SNR ratio is within the normal
range, the lamps are green. As soon as the width of the SNR ratio exceeds the
normal range, the corresponding lamps turn red. An operator, at the control
room, can interpret the status of the five transformers, in the following way: (i)
The transformer T1 is failing if only lamps 1 and 2 turn red, (ii) T2 is failing if
lamps 1, 2 and 3 turn red, (iii) T3 is failing if lamp 1 turns red, and so on.
Our results for power system test cases are tabulated in Table 2. The results
show that the number of sensors needed to monitor all the transformers are
fewer than the number of transformers. On an average there were 6.90% and
37.90% savings in the number of sensors using our technique for k = 1 and
k = 2, respectively. From Fig. 3, it can be seen that the difference in the width
of the SNR band in dB at substations S1 and S2 (1 and 2 hop distance away
respectively, from the transformer) is minimal. Accordingly, we can use k = 2
Table 2. No. of sensors needed in IEEE, PEGASE, and Polish systems for k = 1, 2.
Bus System No. of Transformers No. of Sensors
k = 1 k = 2
IEEE 14 5 4 3
IEEE 30 7 6 4
IEEE 57 14 13 10
PEGASE 89 10 10 6
IEEE 118 9 9 5
Polish 2383 155 155 106
results, which implies that significant savings (37.90%) can be realized using our
technique. The ILPs for the test cases were computed using GUROBI for python.
An Intel Core i5-6300HQ CPU with 2.30 GHz and 32 GB RAM was used for our
experiments. The computation time varied from 0.17 seconds, for the smallest
test case (|V1| = 5, |V2| = 40, |E| = 36, k = 1), to 25.18 seconds (|V1| = 155, |V2|
= 5,772, |E| = 3,655, k = 2) for the largest. As the computation times for these
test cases were only a few seconds, we expect that for larger systems involving
thousands of buses and hundreds of transformers, the problem can still be solved
within a short period of time.
8 Conclusion
We present a novel technique involving PMU-based metrics and Identifying Code
to find the least number of sensors to monitor the health of the critical equip-
ments, such as HV power transformers. In the future, we plan to investigate (i)
a fault tolerant monitoring system, where the system will be able to uniquely
identify a failing critical equipment, even when one or more of the sensors are
malfunctioning, and (ii) multiple simultaneous failure of critical equipments, in
the sense that, not only failure of individual equipments will have a unique sig-
nature, but also failure of a set of equipments will have a unique fault signature.
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